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Abstract 
The major purpose of this paper is to analyze the actual exchange rate policies followed by Egypt since the Central 
Bank of Egypt (CBE) announced its adoption of a floating ER regime in January 2003.  
Based on our analytical and empirical approaches to analyzing the actual degree of flexibility of exchange rate policies 
we concluded the following. First, the de jure “Free Floating” ER Regime that the CBE announced in January, 2003 
was not preserved during the period of the study. Second, the changes in the IMF’s de facto classifications of Egypt’s 
actual exchange rate policies were broadly accurate. Third, the move from light to heavy exchange market management 
in 2011 leads to what has been called a one way speculative option. Fourth, too much attention has been paid to the US 
dollar in setting exchange rate policies. Since the dollar exchange rate sometimes moves substantially against some of 
these other currencies such as the Euro, it is important that such fluctuations should also be taken into account. 
Keywords: Exchange Rate Regimes Estimation, Exchange Rate Regimes Classification, Exchange Rate Regimes, 
Exchange Rate Policies, and Exchange Market Pressure. 
1. Introduction 
In order to make a sound recommendation for a country exchange rate policy, it is valuable to evaluate how well its 
exchange rate policies have operated in the past. This in turn requires determination of what policies a country actually 
followed. The latter is a nontrivial question because recent research has shown that the exchange rate regimes that 
countries actually follow frequently diverge from those officially reported to the IMF.  
Where a country is following a narrowly pegged exchange rate, this regime is easy to classify. It is important however 
to investigate not only the broad type of exchange rate regime that has been adopted but also to analyze how it has been 
operated with the adjustable peg. The key questions are how frequently and by how much the peg is adjusted and what 
are the circumstances that lead to such adjustments? More interesting and more difficult to analyze issues arise when 
countries adopt various forms of flexibility of exchange rate. The easiest of such de facto regimes to analyze in a free 
float which form a theoretical perspective- regimes that a country never (hardly ever) intervenes in the foreign exchange. 
In practice the adoption of such genuine free floating regimes is quite rare. The US dollar and euro closely approximate 
this as have countries such as Canada, Japan, and New Zealand over particular periods, but these are only a small 
percentage of countries following some types of flexible exchange rate regimes.  
Countries sometimes announce that they have adopted a free float when they are in fact using official intervention to 
manage the exchange rate. This was true of Egypt after 2003. Another example is Korea (see Willett et Al., 2009). 
A crawling peg regime, which Egypt announced in January 2001, is easy to classify as a type of regime, but important 
questions remain about how flexibly it was operated. In most standard classifications, crawling pegs are put more 
toward the fixed end of the exchange rate spectrum than a managed float. Research has shown however, that some 
managed floats have operated with less flexibility than some crawling pegs and vice versa (see Willett et al., 2005).For 
an illustration of this for the exchange rates of several Asian countries before the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.  
Thus, with both crawling pegs and managed floats it is important to analyze how they actually operated and how this 
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may have varied over time. For example, was there actually more flexibility during Egypt’s managed float regime than 
for its crawling peg and did their relationship vary over different time periods. 
The major purpose of this paper is to analyze the actual exchange rate policies followed by Egypt since the Central 
Bank of Egypt (CBE) announced its adoption of a floating ER regime in January 2003. For these purposes it is not 
sufficient to determine whether a country has adopted a floating exchange rate. It is also important to analyze how 
heavily and in what ways the exchange rate is managed. For these purposes we adopt analytic and empirical approaches 
to review Egypt’s exchange rate policies. 
The importance of this paper comes from the lack of the study that deals with the issue of the estimation of exchange 
rate policy in Egypt. Providing an accurate estimation of the exchange rate policy in Egypt helps in providing sound 
recommendations for the Egyptian authorities in order to deal with the disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market. 
This enables the Egyptian authorities to adopt the right exchange rate regime that corrects the disequilibrium in foreign 
exchange market and ends the one direction speculation option on the Egyptian Pound. 
Correcting the disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market in Egypt and ending up the one way speculation option 
helps in correcting other macroeconomic variables in the Egyptian economy. For instance, El-Ramly and Abdel-Haleim 
(2008) has found that the devaluations of the Egyptian Pound over the period from 1982 to 2004 have an initial 
contractionary effect on output in Egypt. Massoud (forthcoming) has found an impact of exchange rate movements on 
domestic prices. CPI and PPI are affected by the movements in exchange rate of the Egyptian Pound.          
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section (1) provides a brief summary of the literature that deals 
with identifying ER regimes. Section (2) presents a historical reading of Egypt’s ER regime before the float. Section (3) 
presents an analytical view for the ER behavior for the Egyptian Pound after the float. Section (4) provides a 
comparison between our EMP approach and IMF’s classification of Egypt’s exchange rate regimes. Section (5) presents 
the findings and policy implications that come out of our study.   
2. Literature Review 
Recent research has shown that countries' actual exchange rate policies often differ from their stated policies. This has 
given rise to a number of efforts to classify exchange rate regimes on a de facto basis. For a recent review of these 
measures (see Willett et al., 2011). These include several different types of statistical measures and a new set of 
classifications from the IMF that is based on its staff judgments in classifying the de facto exchange rate regime for its 
member countries. For instance, in 1998, the IMF revised its classification of the de jure “Managed Floating” ER 
regime in Egypt to a de facto “Conventional Fixed Peg” ER regime. The IMF in 2012 revised its own de facto 
classification of ER regime in Egypt from a “Crawl-Like Arrangement” to a “Stabilized Arrangement”.  
A heroic effort to classify a large number of exchange rate regimes has been undertaken by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
while their classification has many desirable features such as including inflation and dual exchange rate regimes, it 
suffers from looking only at the behavior of the exchange rate and not adjusting for the extent of official intervention. 
As a consequence they misclassify countries such as Japan and Korea as having free floating regimes over periods in 
which they had substantial movements in their exchange rates but also massive intervention in the foreign exchange 
market.  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) uses cluster analysis of changes in exchange rates regime but their methodology 
allows them only to differentiate between fixed, crawling peg, and floating rate regimes and does not provide a method 
of analyzing the degree of official management of flexible regimes. A third approach is presented by Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002) based on the variances of changes in reserves, exchange rate, and interest rates. The use of the ratios of 
variances does not allow one to distinguish the extent of management in individual Periods of short duration. The use of 
interest rates is also problematic as one cannot tell from this statistical data whether an interest rate move by a desire to 
limit currency depreciation or to diminish the loss of reserves.  
For the purpose of this paper we follow the conclusion of recent studies that the approach of looking directly at the 
ratios of changes in exchange rates is not appropriate. It is important to also take into account the shocks that a country 
faces. Thus, for example, over a particular period an exchange rate may show little variation because there is heavy 
official intervention to limit exchange rate fluctuation. But there could also be little interventions and few shocks. 
Where there are a number of large shocks, a country that intervenes fairly heavily may still have a lower exchange rate 
variability than a country with a high propensity to intervene in the foreign exchange market, which is the key 
characteristic of a none flexible management of the exchange rate.  
Conceptually the magnitude of shocks in foreign exchange market corresponds to the size of the corresponding shifts in 
demand and supply schedules for foreign exchange. These shifts correspond to the concept of exchange market pressure 
(EMP) generated by shocks to foreign exchange market. The foundation of the concept of EMP was introduced by 
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Girton, L. and Roper, D., (1977). However, the first use of the concept of exchange market pressure for the statistical 
measurement of exchange rate flexibility was by Weymark (1995, 1997, and 1998). Her particular methodology suffered 
from some technical problems, however, see Willett et al (2011) and (2012). 
Frankel and Wei (2008 and 2009) and Willett et al (2005) developed another approach also based on the concept of 
EMP. Their approach investigates the degree to which shifts in demand and supply in the foreign exchange market are 
allowed to move the exchange rate versus being offset by official intervention. This approach has often been used based 
on exchange rate behavior with respect to a single major foreign currency. For application for the Japanese yen and 
Korean won against the dollar see Willett et al (2009), (2012) and (2011). For many countries, however, the exchange 
rates with respect to more than one foreign currency may be important. To deal with this issue Frankel and Wei (2008 
and 2009) developed their approach to include the behavior of multiple foreign exchange rates. Their approach draws 
on their earlier approach to estimate the de facto weights of a set of foreign currencies where countries are managing 
their exchange rate against a basket of foreign currencies.  
In a freely floating exchange rate the size can be measured by the movement of the exchange rate while under a fixed 
exchange rate system it would be measured by the size of the amount of official intervention required to maintain the 
exchange rate constant (in empirical studies this is usually proxied by the change in a country’s international reserves). 
Under a managed float the shock will result in some combination of change in the exchange rate and official 
intervention. The ratio of the movements in the exchange rate relative to the change in reserves provide a measure of the 
strength of the propensity of the authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange market and its inverse the degree of 
exchange rate flexibility.  
Ideally one would want to weight the two types of changes by the slope of the excess demand curve in the foreign 
exchange market. Good estimates of such slopes are not available, however we weight them equally. For discussion of 
the issues involved in weighting see Willett et al. (2013).  
A separate analysis could be undertaken to estimate a Taylor rule type reaction function for a country that includes 
exchange rate in the reaction function. A complete analysis of a country’s exchange rate cum Monetary regime would 
include estimates of the extent to which the domestic monetary effects of exchange market intervention are sterilized or 
not. 
For discussion of this and farther analysis of the other statistical measures (see Willett et al., 2011). In addition to these 
statistical measures, there is also now available at the IMF a set of de facto classifications based on the judgment of 
IMF staff about the exchange rate policies actually followed. For many purposes these classifications are extremely 
useful but they are weak in terms of characterizing the extent of management of the managed floats. We do however 
compare our statistical measures with the de facto classification of the IMF. Again see the survey by Willett et al (2011).  
There are two studies that examined the de facto ER regime in Egypt. The first study is Selim (2010). The study 
investigated if there was a significant change in the exchange rate behavior with the announcement of the float of the 
Egyptian Pound on January, 2003. It used LYS methodology in order to classify Egypt’s exchange rate after the float. 
The study used the Chow test for structural break. It concluded that according to the Chow test’s results, there was no 
significant change associated in the exchange behavior with the announcement of the float. The author concluded that 
she was not able to classify the Egyptian exchange regime by using LYS methodology.  
The second study is Kamar and Bakardzhieva (2005). This study used a single-equation approach to cointegration. It 
concluded that the Egyptian authorities have always managed the exchange regime, whether under the label of 
“adjustable peg”, “crawling peg” or the de facto management of its de jure free float. This conclusion leaves open, 
however, the important question of how heavily the exchange rate is managed.    
3. Reading the History of ER Regime in Egypt before the announcement of the float: an Analytical Approach 
Before we analyze the de facto ER regime in Egypt after the floating of the Egyptian Pound in January 2003, we believe 
that it is important to read the history of how Egypt ER regime was operated in the previous periods. We are not doing 
so in a purely narrative way, rather we connect the analysis of the ER regime to two dimensions. The first dimension is 
the movements in ER of the Egyptian Pound. The second dimension is the movements of the total foreign reserves at the 
Central Bank of Egypt. In this section, we examine the ER regimes that Egypt followed before the de jure floating ER 
regime that took place in January 2003. We can distinguish between three ER regimes that Egypt followed during this 
period. These ER regimes are: fixed adjustable peg, managed floating, and crawling peg. The rest of this section sheds 
the light on how ER regime in Egypt had been operated before the float. 
3.1 The Fixed but Adjustable Peg ER Regime 
Starting from the sixties till 1990, Egypt had put a fixed but adjustable peg in practice. The Egyptian authority had kept 
the ER of the Egyptian Pound fixed to the USD. The CBE had adjusted the ER of the Egyptian pound from 1.1 LE per 
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1$ to 2 LE per 1$ in July 1990. Chart (1) captures the jump of the ER for the Egyptian pound. The question here is: 
What is the impact of this devaluation on reserves? Chart (2) shows that reserves had grown after the devaluation of the 
Egyptian Pound. Reserves had increased from 1.6 BL $ in July 1990 to 2.7 BL$ in December 1990 and jumped in 
January 1991 to 3.2BL$. This may indicate that the CBE allowed the ER of the Egyptian Pound to move and did not 
intervene to prevent the deterioration of its value against the USD. This may be true. However, we rather argue that the 
CBE might intervened against the wind to keep the ER of the Egyptian Pound at 2 LE per 1$ but if failed to do so. We 
build our argument on two points: the first one is the decline in reserves over the last two months in 1990. Reserves 
declined from 3.9 BL$ in October 1990 to 2.7 BL$ in December 1990. The second is that, if the CBE could defend its 
fixed adjustable peg, it would not change it shortly at the beginning of 1991. 
3.2 The Managed Floating ER Regime 
In February 1991 as a part of the economic reform program, the Egyptian authority changed its ER policy from the 
adoption of a fixed but adjustable peg ER regime to a managed floating ER regime. As a result of the new regime, the 
ER of the Egyptian Pounds devalued from 2LE per 1$ to 3.4$, on average between February 1991 and December 2000. 
As chart (1) shows, the ER of the Egyptian Pound was moving up slowly against the USD. Regarding reserves, during 
the period from January 1991 to December 2001, we can distinguish between two sub-periods. The first period is from 
January 1991 to September 1997. Over this period, reserves increased steadily from 3.1BL$ in January 1991 to reach its 
peak of 19.1 BL$ in September 1997, as chart (2) shows.  This may have happened because of the foreign debt relief 
for Egypt as a result of its reaction to the first “Gulf War” in 1991.The CBE had kept the ER for the Egyptian Pound to 
what extent stable against the USD. The second period from October 1997 to December 2000. As chart (1) shows, the 
CBE had kept the ER for the Egyptian Pound fixed against the USD at 3.388 LE per 1$ between October 1997 and 
January 1999. But how did the CBE had keep the ER of the Egyptian Pound fixed during this period? Chart (2) 
provides an answer. As chart (2) shows, the CBE had lost about 5% of its reserves. Reserves declined to be about 
18BL$. As a result of losing reserves, the CBE had depreciated the ER of the Egyptian Pound through 1998 and 1999. 
However, it continued to lose reserves to the point that the reserves stock was only 13.1BL$ in December2000. It is 
worth mentioning that during this period, Egypt was exposed to three major shocks: (1) the terrorist act in Luxor in 
1997 and its implications on the tourism sector, which is considered to be a main source of foreign currencies in Egypt. 
(2) the Asian Crisis that took place in 1997 and 1998 and caused huge capital outflows from Egypt. (3) the second” 
INTIFADAH” for the Palestinian people which took place in 2000 and its negative implications on the Egyptian 
economy, especially on tourism and foreign investments.  In 1998, the IMF revised its classification of the de jure 
“Managed Floating” ER regime in Egypt to a de facto “Conventional Fixed Peg” ER regime rather than the official 
classification of a managed float regime. Table (1) in the appendix shows the history of the IMF’s de facto 
classifications of Egypt’s exchange rate regime. 
3.3 The Crawling Peg ER Regime 
In January 2001, the CBE announced the adoption of a de jure” Crawling Peg ER Regime”. Over the period from 
January 2001 to December 2002, the ER of the Egyptian Pound was devalued three times. The first time was when the 
CBE adopted the new ER regime. At that time the ER for the Egyptian Pound was set at 3.85 LE per 1$. The second 
time was on September 2001, as a result of the 9/11 terrorist act against the USA and its implications on the Egyptian 
economy. The CBE devalued the Egyptian Pound to 4.14 LE per 1$. The third time was in January 2002. As the effects 
of the 9/11 attack continued, the losses in the tourism sector in Egypt continued, the CBE forced to devalue the 
Egyptian Pound one more time and it set the ER at 4.5 LE per 1$. The CBE kept this rate till its announcement of 
adopting floating ER regime in January 2003. Chart (1) and chart (5) capture these developments in the ER of the 
Egyptian Pound. During this period of adopting a de jure “Crawling Peg ER Regime”, reserves fluctuated between 
14.1BL$ (in July 2001) and 12.5 BL$ (in February 2002), as Chart (2) and chart (6) show.  
3.4 Conclusion 
From our analytical review of the history of the ER regimes in Egypt, we reach the following conclusions: 
1- When Egypt was exposed to external or internal shocks, the Egyptian authorities, in most of the cases, tried to 
absorb these shocks by leaning against the wind, then once it to lost reserves to a critical point, the CBE allowed the 
ER of the Egyptian Pounds to depreciate and an announcement adopting of a new ER regime was made.  
2- External shocks and their implications on the Egyptian economy were, in almost all the cases, the major reason for 
the CBE to adopt new ER regime.   
3- The ER of the Egyptian Pound during this period, regardless the de jure ER regime or the de facto ER that CBE put 
in practice, was pegged to the USD in tighter or looser ways.  
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4. The de facto vs. the de jure Egyptian ER Regime after the Float 
In January 2003, the CBE announced the new” Free Floating ER Regime” to be followed in Egypt. Since this time, 
there have been doubts that this de jure “Free Floating” was really being followed by the CBE. This doubt spread not 
only among market participants, but also among local economists and those at the IMF. After only a year of the new de 
jure ER regime, the IMF revised its classification of Egypt’s ER regime as follows. In 2004, 2005, and 2006, the IMF 
classified Egypt’s ER regime to a de facto “Managed Floating With no predetermined path for ER” combined with a 
policy framework defined as following a “Monetary Aggregate Target”. In 2008, the IMF changed its classification of 
Egypt’s ER regime to a de facto “other Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangement” with ER as a nominal anchor. In 2009, 
the IMF again reclassified Egypt’s ER regime as a de facto “Managed Floating with no Predetermined Path for ER”. In 
2011, the IMF reclassified Egypt’s ER regime as a de facto “Craw-Like Arrangement”. Few months later, in 2012, the 
IMF reclassified Egypt’s ER regime as a de facto “Stabilized Arrangement”. In 2013, the IMF reclassified Egypt’s ER 
regime as a de facto “Craw-Like Arrangement” with the ER used as a nominal anchor. 
It is worth mentioning that in estimating Egypt’s exchange rate regime after the float using EMP approach, we faced 
major difficulties. These difficulties were the common three major difficulties in applying the EMP approach to 
evaluating the degree of flexibility or management of a country’s exchange rate policy. One is to obtain data on the 
country’s exchange market intervention. Few countries make this information public. Thus, researchers had to use 
reported changes in reserves as a crude proxy. At least three problems make this an imperfect proxy. First, some 
increases in reserves such as some that accompany foreign aid do not go through the market. Secondly, interest earnings 
on reserves lead to increases in the stock of reserves without intervention. Third, changes in exchange rates may lead to 
valuation changes. On average these considerations lead increases in reserves to overstate amounts of intervention and 
declines in reserves to understate intervention. Thus, for example the modest increases in Egypt’s reserves in 2008 
through 2010 should not be taken as indication that there was any substantial intervention to push up the currency.  
A second problem is that a country has exchange rates against many currencies while many studies have used just the 
exchange rate against a major currency such as the dollar. Fluctuations in the value of the dollar against third currency 
can influence the overall degree of flexibility of a country’s currency. Frankel and Wei (2008) and (2009) have 
developed an approach to estimating the implicit weights in a country’s policies toward a basket of currencies. This 
approach was extended from estimating the weights in basket pegs to cases of greater exchange rate flexibility. 
However, their technique has been less successful in in this content. We applied their approach to Egypt during the 
floating rate period but results often did not make sense.  
The third problem in that the EMP index of flexibility is clearly defined only in the cases where the central bank is 
intervening against the wind, i.e. accumulating reserves to hold down the rate of appreciation or using reserves to limit 
depreciations. Sometimes, however, previous studies have found reserve increases while currencies are depreciating or 
reserve losses when currencies are appreciating. Egypt has been no exception. Such “wrong sign” episodes are likely 
frequently due to the imperfect nature of reserve changes as a proxy for actual intervention. Where this isn’t the case it 
would will that the country was actively intervening to increase rather than reduce exchange rate movements. Such 
actions could be interpreted either as super flexibility or as super management.  
In the previous section, we concluded that the Egyptian authorities had been trying to limit the fluctuations of the ER of 
the Egyptian Pound against the dollar as much as it can. To investigate to what extent this occurred, we examined the 
behavior of the ER of the Egyptian Pound with respect to the USD and two other main currencies, the Euro and the 
British Pound. Chart (3) shows that the ER of the Egyptian Pound against the USD was fairly stable compared with the 
ER of the Egyptian Pound against both the Euro and the British Pound through the period from January 2003 to 
November 2012. This finding indicates that the CBE had used the ER of the Egyptian Pound against the USD as an 
implicit anchor for its monetary policy. As chart (4) shows, the ER of the USD went through periods of depreciation and 
appreciation between January 2003 and December 2012.  
By comparing the ER of the Egyptian Pound against the Euro and the British Pound during the same period, as chart (3) 
shows, we see that the ER of the Egyptian Pound against these two currencies had followed almost the same behavior of 
the ER of the USD against these two currencies. This finding supports our argument of that the CBE was using the ER 
of the Egyptian Pound against the dollar as an anchor for monetary policy in Egypt and allowing it to move more 
flexibly against the euro and the British Pound. Another point that supports our argument is that since the CBE adopted 
the new system in the exchange market with the auctions for USDs in December 2012, the ER of the Egyptian Pounds 
has fluctuated against the USD dollar and against both the Euro and the British Pound. These movements were captured 
in chart (3). 
In the remaining part of this section, we discuss four main shocks that faced the Egyptian economy during the period of 
our study as follows. 
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4.1 Floating the Pound in January 2003   
In January 2003, the CBE announced the adoption of the” Free Floating ER Regime”.  As shown in Charts (1 and 7), 
the Egyptian Pounds lost around 20% of its value against the USD during the month of the adoption of the new regime. 
The ER of the Egyptian Pound increased from 4.5 LE per 1 $ to be 5.4 LE per 1$. This depreciation continued untill 
December 2004, when the ER for the Egyptian Pound reached 6.3 LE per 1$. During this period, reserves were 
fluctuating with an increasing trend. They increased from 12.9 BL$ in December 2002 to 14.3 BL$ in December 2004. 
As charts (3 and 4) show, the CBE during this period was intervening to keep the ER of the Egyptian Pound against the 
USD as quite stable. 
4.2 Inflation Targeting in January 2005  
In January 2005, the CBE announced its intention to adopt inflation targeting as a nominal anchor for the monetary 
policy over the medium term. This step affected the ER of the Egyptian Pound instantly. The Egyptian Pound 
appreciated against the US, moving from 6.1 LE per 1$ to be 5.8 LE per 1$. As charts (1 and 9) show, the ER of the 
Egyptian Pound appreciated modestly then fluctuated within a narrow range against the USD. Once again this was not 
the case for the ER of the Egyptian Pound against the Euro and the British Pound as chart (3) shows. Chart (10) shows 
that reserves steadily increased from 15.4 BL$ in January 2005 to 21.3 LB$ in June 2006. This trend in reserves 
continued on untill December 2010 when the reserves stock reached a record of 33.6 BL$.         
4.3 25
th
. Of January Revolution in 2011 
In 25
th
 of January 2011, what is called the 25
th
 of January revolution erupted. As a result, Egypt has been in political and 
social instability. There have been great impacts of this event on the Egyptian economy. What happened in the exchange 
market was not far from what was going on in the political scene. It might be expected that the ER of the Egyptian 
Pound would depreciate substantially. Surprisingly, as shown in chart (11), this was not the case. The ER of the 
Egyptian Pound against the USD was fairly stable, only depreciating from 5.8 LE per 1$ in January 2011 to be 6.1 LE 
per 1$ in November 2012. Two main things explain this behavior. First, the huge amount of the decline that happened 
in reserves during this period. As chart (2) shows, by the end of year 2012, reserves had dramatically declined to a very 
low level indicating that the authorities had been intervening heavily to prop up the currency. Reserves declined to 11.6 
BL$ from 32.6BL$ in January 2011. Secondly, as Chart (3) shows, during this period while the ER of the Egyptian 
Pound was fairly stable against the dollar, it was fluctuating substantially against both the British Pound and the Euro. 
Thus, there is a strong evidence that the CBE had been intervening extensively to keep the ER of the Egyptian Pound 
stable against the USD. 
4.4 The Introduction of Auctions of USDs in December 2012 
In order to stop the huge losses of reserves and to take a step farther to put the floating ER regime in practice, the CBE 
announced the adoption of a new system of putting the USD on auction. 
The quick result of the new regime was the depreciation of the Egyptian Pound against the USD, the Euro, and the 
British Pound. Charts (3 and 13) show that. 
5. EMP Flexibility Assessment of Egypt’s Exchange Rate Regime and the IMF Classifications 
The following table shows the IMF de facto classifications of exchange rate regime in Egypt during the period from 
2003 to 2013. In columns (1 and 2), we calculated the change in exchange rate of the Egyptian Pound against the US 
dollar and the changes in the ratio of international reserves to monetary base for each individual year from 2003 to 2013. 
From this table we can conclude that the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound was managed with various degree of 
flexibility against the US dollar, but has never been allowed to freely float. 
As table (1) shows, during Egypt’s floating rate period there have been a number of such “wrong signs” but they have 
generally been cases where were small. Thus, we are inclined toward interpreting most of these years such as 2003 and 
2004 as ones with a high degree of flexibility. For further discussion of this issue see Willett et al. (2011).  
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Table 1. Changes in the exchange rate & reserves and IMF de facto classifications of ER 
Year 
Annual changes 
in ER (%) 
Annual changes in 
reserves (%) 
 
IMF Classifications 
Change in Reserves/MB (%) 
(monthly average for each year) 
2003 34.86597 4.997293 
Managed floating with no 
pre-determined path for the exchange 
rate 
0.0444 
2004 0.82348 8.507654 
Managed floating with no 
pre-determined path for the exchange 
rate 
0.050506 
2005 -2.292 33.39 Managed floating 0.333213 
2006 -0.32999 17.05889 
Other conventional fixed peg 
arrangements 
0.138936 
2007 -3.1086 23.13235 Managed floating 0.156657 
2008 0 4.850766 
Managed floating with no 
pre-determined path for the exchange 
rate 
0.047475 
2009 -0.83593 2.28691 Other Managed Arrangement 0.003486 
2010 6.352521 4.049083 Other Managed Arrangement 0.036144 
2011 3.563728 -54.0279 Crawl-like arrangement -0.57313 
2012 2.072195 -11.3716 Stabilized arrangement -0.10283 
2013 5.392936 32.55826 Crawl-like arrangement 0.137716 
Source: Authors calculation from the IFS data base. 
To estimate the degree of the flexibility of the exchange rate regime in Egypt, we used the exchange market pressure 
(EMP) methodology introduced by Frankel and Wei (2008 and 2009). This approach investigates the degree to which 
shifts in demand and supply in the foreign exchange market are allowed to move the exchange rate versus being offset 
by official intervention. This approach has often been used based on exchanged rate behavior with respect to a single 
major foreign currency. For application for the Japanese yen and Korean won against the dollar see Willett et al (2009) 
and (2011). For many countries, however, the exchange rates with respect to more than one foreign currency may be 
important. To deal with this issue Frankel and Wei (2008) and (2009) developed a methodology that includes the 
behavior of multiple foreign exchange rates.  
Following Frankel and Wei (2008 and 2009), we define the EMP as the percentage change in the value of the currency 
plus the change in reserves as a fraction of the monetary base. The Special Drawing Right (SDR) is used as a numeraire 
following Frankel and Wei (2004, 2008, and 2009). To avoid non-stationarity that is likely to occur in time series, the 
variables are used in terms of changes rather than levels.  
Following Frankel and Wei, we used the following equation in order to estimate the degree of flexibility of the ER in 
Egypt after the float. 
Δ log EGYPt = C + ∑ w(j) Δ log X(j)t + δ { Δ empt } + µt                 (1) 
Where: 
Δ log EGYPt is the change of the log value of the Egyptian Pound ER ( per SDR) in period t. 
Δ log X(j)t  is the change of the log value of the currencies ( X1,X2,…, and Xn) ER (per SDR) in period t. 
w(j) is the coefficient that represents the de facto weights of the used currencies and it will be w1, w2,…, and wn  
Δ empt = Δ log EGYPt + Δ Rest /MBt                                  (2) 
Where: 
Δ empt denotes the percentage change in the exchange market pressure that is the increase of the net international 
demand for the Egyptian Pound, which may show up in either in the price of the Egyptian Pound or the change in the 
quantity of international reserves depending on the policies of the CBE (floating vs. fixed). 
δ denotes the coefficient that captures the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility. It takes values between 0 and 1. If 
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δ = 0 this means the ER of   the Egyptian Pound is fixed, while if δ = 1 this mean that ER of the Egyptian Pound is 
freely floating. Any number in between represents the degree of flexibility of the ER for the Egyptian Pound. USD, 
Euro, and BP were picked as the weighted basket, as they are the three major currencies affecting Egypt’s international 
transactions. Thus, we can rewrite equation (1) to be the following.  
Δ log EGYPt = C +  w1 Δ log USDt + w2 Δ log EUROt + w3 Δ log BPt  +    δ { Δ empt } + µt        (3) 
We dropped using the Saudi Real and Kuwaiti Dinar because they are pegged to the dollar. Also, we dropped using the 
UAE Dirham because it is pegged to a basket of currencies that are dominated by the USD, Euro, and BP.  
While this approach was originally developed using the home exchange rate against only one major foreign currency, a 
broader approach has been introduced by Frankel and Wei (2008 and 2009).  
The following table shows the summary of the estimation results: 
Table 2. The Estimation Results 
Coefficients 
 
Period 
(1) 
Period 
(2) 
Period 
(3) 
Period  
(4) 
USD 0.0200 
(1.382) 
0.0223 
(1.589) 
0.015 
(1.120) 
0.171 
(4.800) 
EURO 0.0005 
(0.181) 
0.0009 
(0.370) 
0.003 
(1.270) 
-0.006 
(-0.925) 
BP 0.00002 
(0.647) 
0.00002 
(0.639) 
-0.0002 
(-1.342) 
-0.0001 
(-0.635) 
Δ emp 0.876 
(21.087) 
0.871 
(20.710) 
0.975 
(27.139) 
0.031 
(0.293) 
Constant -0.00008 
(-0.302) 
-0.00006 
(-0.232) 
-0.001 
(-5.371) 
0.0012 
(2.567) 
R
2
 0.885 0.896 0.957 0.939 
F 234 244 370 70 
DW 0.995 0.740 0.893 1.393 
Obs. 127 119 72 23 
 
As table (2) shows, we estimated the index of flexibility (δ) for Egypt’s ER regime using four periods of time as 
follows. 
5.1 Period (1): from January 2003 to August 2013  
This period covers the time frame from the announcement of the float till the last month for which data is available at 
the IFS. As regression (1) shows, the flexibility index is 0.867. This findings mean two things. First, it means that 
Egypt’s exchange rate regime was not free float as officially stated. Second, it rules out the argument that the CBE uses 
the ER of USD as a nominal anchor. The latter goes along with the announcement of the CBE in January 2005 
regarding using inflation targeting as an explicit anchor for monetary policy. Another interesting finding can be seen 
from regressions (1) regarding the weights of various international currencies. As regressions (1) shows, the coefficients 
for all international currencies were very small and the coefficient for the USD was the largest among these currencies. 
This means that the CBE during this period was not pegging the pound against a basket of currencies or to the USD. 
Rather, it was keeping an eye on the ER of the Egyptian Pound in relationship with the dollar. However, this 
relationship was not strong enough to be classified as pegging the Egyptian Pound to the USD. Finally, R
2
 and 
F-statistics in regression (1) suggest that the model fit the data well.   
5.2 Period (2): from January 2003 to November 2012 
This period covers the time frame from the announcement of the float until the adoption of the new system according to 
which the CBE allows auctions on the USDs. As regressions (2) shows, there was not a substantial difference when we 
dropped out the observations after the auctions’ system was introduced by the CBE in December 2012. This may be 
because the number of the omitted observations was small, just 9 observations. This makes estimating Egypt’s ER 
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regime in the future an important issue in deciding whether adopting the auctions’ system affecting the flexibility of 
Egypt’s ER regime or not?    
5.3 Period (3): from January 2005 to December 2010  
This period covers the time frame from the announcement of the intention of the CBE to adopt  inflation targeting as 
an anchor for monetary policy in Egypt until the 25
th
 of January revolution. As regressions (3) shows, during this period, 
flexibility index increased in a substantial amount. It increased from 0.87 to 0.97 which is consistent with the 
announcement of the CBE of its intention of using inflation targeting as a nominal anchor for monetary policy over the 
medium term. Also, R
2
 increased from 0.88 to 0.96 which means the model even fits the data better.  
 
5.4 Period (4): from January 2011 to November 2012  
This period covers the time frame from the 25
th
 of January revolution till the adoption of the auctions system. This 
period had witnessed a huge lost in reserves which may indicate that the CBE was leaning against the winds strongly to 
prevent the depreciation of the Egyptian Pound. The results of the estimations, as shown in regressions (4) support this 
view. In this period, the flexibility index declined dramatically from 0.87 to 0.03 which means that the ER regime that 
the CBE followed during this period was not allowing the shock in the ER market to show up in the ER of the Egyptian 
Pound. Rather, it allowed it to show up in the level of reserves. The increase of the USD coefficient form 0.02 to 0.17 
suggests that the CBE was taking in consideration the ER of the Pound against the dollar during this period much more 
than it has been before.  
6. Findings and Policy Recommendations 
Egypt has had considerable variability in its exchange rate policies over years. During the more recent years of Egypt’s 
official float, its policies have actually varied quite widely. In its early days, exchange rate policy was indeed quite 
flexible, but as has often been the case over time management frequently became heavier.  
Building on our analysis, we summarize our findings as follows: 
1- Since 1990’s, when Egypt was exposed to external or internal shocks, the Egyptian authorities, in most of the cases, 
tried to absorb these shocks by leaning against the wind, then once it to lost reserves to a critical point, the CBE 
allowed the ER of the Egyptian Pounds to depreciate and an announcement of adopting of a new ER regime was 
made.  
2- External shocks and their implications on the Egyptian economy were, in almost all the cases, the major reason for 
the CBE to adopt new ER regimes.   
3- The ER of the Egyptian Pound before announcing the float, regardless the de jure ER regime or the de facto ER that 
CBE put in practice, was pegged to the USD in tighter or looser ways. 
4- The de jure “Free Floating” ER Regime that the CBE announced in January, 2003 was not preserved during the 
period of the study. The de facto exchange rate of the Egyptian Pound was a managed exchange rate regime with 
various degree of flexibility against the US dollar, but has never been allowed to freely float. Egypt is not the only 
country that has claimed to have adopted a free float while continuing to intervene heavily at times to limit its 
fluctuations. This gives another illustration of the importance of carefully investigating the exchange rate regimes 
actually being followed by countries rather than relying exclusively on what governments state their policy to be. 
This finding goes along with what Kamar and Bakardzhieva (2005) has concluded. The study has concluded that 
the Egyptian authorities have always managed the exchange regime, whether under the label of “adjustable per”, 
“Crawling peg” or the de facto management of its de jure free float. 
5- The move from light to heavy exchange market management in 2011 is a source of concern. Where exchange rates 
are heavily managed in the face of continuing exchange market pressures, the government begins to generate 
perverse expectations similar to these that generated such great speculative problems under adjustably pegged 
exchange rate regimes. Such prolonged heavy intervention sets up what has been called a one way speculative 
option. Participants don’t know if these will be a major change in the exchange rate over the near but they do know 
the direction which any major change would be. These prolonged heavy intervention rather offsetting speculative 
pressures can generate even greater ones. This appears to have been the case in Egypt. 
6- Based on our EMP approach to analyzing the actual degree of flexibility of exchange rate policies we found that the 
changes in the IMF’s de facto classifications of Egypt’s actual exchange rate policies were broadly accurate.                   
7- This study uses the official exchange rate for the Egyptian Pound against the dollar. However, because of the 
instability in the foreign exchange market in Egypt and the shortage of foreign currencies in this market, black 
market existed during the study period. Since we do not have access for the data on the exchange rate for the 
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Egyptian Pound in the black market, we did not consider it in our study. Thus, we recommend further research to 
look at the exchange rate of the Egyptian Pound in the black market.  
There are some important policy recommendations drown out of this paper. We advise the Egyptian authorities to do 
the following: 
1- Over the study’s period, there were more than one exchange rate for the Egyptian Pound. These rates are the 
official rate, the unofficial rate at foreign exchange companies, and the unofficial rate in the black market. The 
Egyptian authorities must take all measures that ensure a unified exchange rate for the pound. We believe that only 
lightly managed floating is the most reasonable means to achieve a unified exchange rate for the pound.  
2- We also have concern that too much attention has been paid to the US dollar in setting exchange rate policies. 
Clearly, the exchange rate against the dollar is the most important exchange rate, but several other currencies are 
also important for Egypt’s international transactions. Since the dollar exchange rate sometimes moves substantially 
against some of these other currencies such as the Euro, it is important that such fluctuations should also be taken 
into account.  
Thus, if the Egyptian authorities have to intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the exchange rate for the 
Egyptian Pound, it should not only intervene against the dollar. Rather, they should consider other major currencies 
that are important in the international transactions for Egypt.  
3. Exchange rate policy should more consistently follow a lightly managed float. There are times when it is appropriate 
for the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market to smooth exchange rate fluctuations and help 
maintain an orderly foreign exchange market. As noted above, however, continued high levels of intervention can 
lead to overvalued exchange rates that result in destabilizing rather than stabilizing the market. Thus, excessively 
heavy management of the exchange rate can prove to be highly disruptive, as recent events have shown. 
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Appendix (1) 
Table (1) IMF classification of Egypt ER regime 
Year IMF  Egypt ER regimes’ classification 
2013 Crawl-like arrangement 
2012 Stabilized arrangement  
2011 Crawl-like arrangement 
2010 Other Managed Arrangement 
2009 Other Managed Arrangement 
2008 Managed floating with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate 
2007 Managed floating 
2006 Other conventional fixed peg arrangements 
2005 Managed floating 
2004 Managed floating with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate 
2003 Managed floating with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate 
2002 “Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%” 
2000-2001 “Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%” 
1999 Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
1991-1998 Conventional Fixed Peg 
“Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%” 
1970-1990 De facto peg 
Notice: data from 1970 to 2002 was taken from: Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2014). “This Time is 
Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.” Princeton University Press. 
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